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North Korea-Linked APT37 Expands into Air-Gapped Networks with “Ruby Jumper”

Air-gapped networks exist for one reason: to keep the most sensitive systems physically separated from the internet. In practice, however, air gaps rarely mean “no connection ever.” Organizations still move files, patches, reports, and logs using removable media and controlled transfer stations. Threat actors who can reliably weaponize that transfer path can turn an air gap into a slow, but functional, two-way bridge. New reporting indicates that North Korea-linked APT37 has expanded its operational capability with a campaign dubbed Ruby Jumper , featuring removable media infection tooling intended to breach or interact with air-gapped systems. This development matters because it shifts the threat model: the attack surface becomes not just endpoints and email, but every controlled transfer workflow and every USB-handling policy across high-security environments. Who is APT37 and why does this shift matter? ...

Google Disrupts UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Cyber Espionage Campaign

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has revealed the disruption of a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign linked to a threat actor known as UNC2814 . The operation, tracked under the name GRIDTIDE , had reportedly been active since at least 2017 and targeted dozens of organizations across the globe. According to the investigation, the campaign successfully infiltrated at least 53 organizations in 42 countries , focusing primarily on government institutions and telecommunications providers across Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The operation demonstrated a high degree of persistence and operational stealth, enabling attackers to remain embedded in victim environments for extended periods. One of the most notable elements of the campaign was its use of Google Sheets as part of its command-and-control infrastructure, allowing attackers to blend malicious activity within legitimate cloud services. Understanding the UNC2814 Threat Actor UNC2814 is a threat clust...

APT28’s Operation MacroMaze: Webhook-Based Macro Malware Targeting Europe

A sophisticated cyber-espionage campaign attributed to the Russian state-linked threat group APT28 has emerged as one of the most notable intelligence-gathering operations observed in Europe over the past year. The campaign, referred to by researchers as Operation MacroMaze , reportedly ran between September 2025 and January 2026 and primarily targeted organizations across Western and Central Europe. APT28—also widely known as Fancy Bear and tracked in Ukraine as UAC-0001 —is one of the most extensively documented cyber-espionage groups associated with Russian intelligence operations. Over the years, the group has developed a reputation for targeting government institutions, military bodies, political organizations, and security agencies in order to obtain strategic information. Operation MacroMaze represents a notable shift in approach. Rather than deploying complex malware frameworks alone, the attackers leveraged webhook-based macro malware combined with legitimate...

GhostFetch Campaign: Iran-Linked MuddyWater Expands Cyber Espionage Across MENA

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new cyber-espionage campaign attributed to the Iranian state-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as MuddyWater . The operation, dubbed “GhostFetch” , is actively targeting government institutions and corporate entities across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) . The campaign reflects a broader pattern of cyber operations aligned with geopolitical tensions in the region. By deploying custom malware designed for stealth, persistence, and intelligence collection, the attackers aim to silently infiltrate networks, extract sensitive information, and maintain long-term access to strategic targets. For security teams and national cyber defenders, the emergence of GhostFetch signals a continuation of Iran’s increasingly sophisticated cyber strategy—one that blends espionage, influence operations, and long-term reconnaissance. Who Is MuddyWater? MuddyWater is a well-documented Iranian state-sponsored threat group ...

“Held in Perpetuity”: Why Chinese Telecom Data Theft Becomes a Long-Term Espionage Weapon

A modern cyber intrusion does not end when access is removed, passwords are rotated, or a vendor issues a patch. For nation-state intelligence services, the most valuable outcome is often data —and unlike malware, stolen data is not “cleaned up” by incident response. It becomes an enduring intelligence asset. In a recent briefing, U.S. federal investigators warned that Chinese state-aligned telecom intruders are likely retaining stolen information “in perpetuity” —archiving it for future espionage operations and long-term surveillance. The warning was linked to ongoing telecommunications intrusions attributed to China, including activity commonly discussed under the “telecom hacker” umbrella (e.g., clusters such as Salt Typhoon ). Strategic implication: A telecom breach is not only an event. It can become a permanent intelligence archive. Even years late...

DHS Pressures Tech to Unmask Anti-ICE Users: Administrative Subpoenas, Anonymity, and Domestic Surveillance Risk

Reports in early 2026 describe a significant uptick in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s use of administrative subpoenas to request identifying information from major technology platforms about social media accounts that criticize or track Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity. The requests reportedly sought account-linked identity data—such as names, emails, and phone numbers—and have been described as “hundreds” of subpoenas sent across multiple platforms. Why this matters: Administrative subpoenas can be issued by an agency without the same up-front judicial process as a warrant. When used to unmask anonymous political speech, the tool becomes a flashpoint: it can be framed as officer-safety enforcement—or as a chilling mechanism for dissent. What’s Being Reported According to reporting summarized by outlets ci...

Lotus Blossom’s Supply-Chain Operation: How a Notepad++ Compromise Could Turn a Developer Tool into a Global Espionage Platform

Advanced cyber-espionage no longer requires “breaking in” one organization at a time. Increasingly, well-resourced threat actors compromise trusted software distribution channels , enabling them to reach large populations through routine installs and updates. A recent report and briefing (discussed publicly in mid-February) described activity attributed to the China state-aligned threat group commonly tracked as Lotus Blossom (also referred to as Spring Dragon , Thrip , Billbug , and KTA529 ). The findings allege that the group compromised Notepad++ hosting infrastructure between June and December 2025 to deliver a previously undocumented backdoor named CHRYSALIS for espionage. Why this matters: Developer tools sit close to credentials, code, build systems, and privileged infrastructure access. A supply-chain compromise of a popular editor ca...