Polish Officials Attribute Cyberattacks to Russian FSB

Polish authorities, including CERT Polska, formally attributed a coordinated series of late-December 2025 cyberattacks against critical energy infrastructure to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). The attacks, which unfolded on December 29–30, 2025, impacted more than 30 renewable energy facilities, a manufacturing firm, and a combined heat and power (CHP) plant serving nearly half a million customers. Polish officials characterized these actions as primarily destructive in nature—comparable to “digital arson”—but also highlighted their broader hybrid threat context, blending sabotage with intelligence collection and reconnaissance. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}

Incident Overview: Scope and Targets

According to a report published by CERTE Polska and national authorities, the December 2025 attacks constituted one of the most significant assaults on Poland’s critical infrastructure in recent memory. Key targets included: :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

  • 30+ wind and solar farms across multiple regions;
  • A large combined heat and power (CHP) plant supplying heat to ~500,000 residents;
  • A manufacturing firm whose infrastructure appeared opportunistically targeted.

The coordinated nature and geographic diversity of the attacks reflect a sophisticated, multi-vector operation designed to stress energy sector information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) domains simultaneously. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}

Attribution: FSB and Divergent Technical Perspectives

Polish officials directly attributed the attacks to units of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), specifically citing overlaps with threat clusters tracked under names such as “Berserk Bear,” “Dragonfly,” and “Static Tundra”—aliases associated with FSB’s Center 16 unit historically focused on energy sector espionage and attacks. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}

However, independent analysis by cybersecurity firms including ESET and Dragos suggested a possible role for another Russian state-linked actor, Sandworm, widely associated with the Russian military intelligence service (GRU). These analysts attributed elements of the malware and tradecraft—particularly the use of a destructive wiper strain dubbed DynoWiper—to Sandworm with moderate confidence. This divergence highlights a broader challenge in incident attribution: overlapping infrastructure, shared toolsets, and parallel objectives may blur clear delineations between distinct Russian intelligence services. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Reconnaissance and Lateral Access

CERT Polska’s detailed report indicated that attackers first gained internal access to the networks of renewable energy substations and the CHP plant, often by exploiting exposed perimeter devices such as Fortinet firewalls and VPN services lacking multi-factor authentication (MFA) or updated firmware. Once inside, the adversary executed reconnaissance to map internal topologies and identify critical industrial control system (ICS) components. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

Destructive Malware Deployment

Multiple variants of destructive malware were identified within compromised networks:

  • DynoWiper: A custom wiper that corrupts and deletes files across ICS devices and human-machine interfaces (HMIs), overwriting firmware or critical configuration data. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}
  • LazyWiper: A PowerShell-based wiper that overwrites files with random data, rendering them unrecoverable. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}

In the CHP plant breach, attackers appear to have engaged in long-term data theft and lateral movement prior to attempting destructive actions—a tactic consistent with deeper espionage preparation before sabotage execution. However, advanced defenses successfully blocked the wiper’s activation in that site. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}

Industrial Disruption Without Blackout

Despite the destructive aim, the attacks failed to produce a blackout or interrupt electricity and heat services. Disruptions were primarily confined to communications and remote control of distributed energy resources, although compromised monitoring systems were rendered inoperable in some renewable facilities. Analysts emphasized that even a more successful sabotage would not have destabilized the national grid during the period of the attack, due in part to redundancy and manual fallback controls in Poland’s energy infrastructure. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}

Strategic Context and Hybrid Threat Implications

These late-2025 cyberattacks cannot be viewed in isolation. Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Poland—and NATO broadly—has faced a sustained pattern of hybrid actions from Russian state actors, ranging from disinformation and kinetic operations to cyber intrusions targeting government, military, and critical infrastructure sectors. :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}

The timing of the attacks—amid severe weather and rising energy demand—suggests malicious intent to exacerbate civilian hardship and undermine public confidence in national resilience. Polish leaders openly acknowledged that the attempt occurred during snowstorms and below-freezing temperatures, amplifying the potential human impact if the sabotage had succeeded. :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}

Operational Lessons and Defensive Imperatives

The Polish incident reveals several critical defensive gaps and lessons relevant to operators of critical infrastructure worldwide:

  • Network Segmentation: Isolate ICS/OT networks from external access paths and ensure VPNs and perimeter devices employ the latest patches and strong authentication. :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA on all remote access points to reduce risk from credential compromise. :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
  • Incident Response Playbooks: Coordinate IT and OT incident response teams for rapid containment of mixed IT/OT threats. :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}
  • Threat Hunting and Baseline Monitoring: Implement anomaly detection across both network and industrial systems to identify reconnaissance behaviors. :contentReference[oaicite:15]{index=15}

The late-December 2025 cyberattacks on Poland’s energy infrastructure underscore the evolving character of state-linked hybrid threats that blend intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and destructive sabotage. Whether attributed to the FSB’s Center 16 unit, Sandworm, or overlapping Russian state hacking clusters, the operation reflects a willingness to target civilian critical services in ways that challenge traditional defensive models and escalate geopolitical tensions.

While the most damaging effects were successfully mitigated, the incident has prompted Poland—and its NATO partners—to reassess resilience strategies for distributed energy resources and interconnected OT environments.

For more insights and updates on cybersecurity, critical infrastructure defense, and threat intelligence, visit NorthernTribe Insider. Stay secure, NorthernTribe.

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